

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

(Nigeria)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.H. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABIERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLOS MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. O.O. ADESOLA
Mr. G.O. OJO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY
Mrs. N. COSMA-KOMPANIEJCZEW

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Mr. J.G. TAHOURLIN
Mr. P.W.J. BUXTON
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 265th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Let me begin by joining those speakers who have given a sincere welcome to our new Brazilian colleague, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira. I am sure that he will bring to our negotiations the talents of an experienced diplomatist and the enthusiasm of a vigorous nation. I should like to take this opportunity of tendering to Mr. Timberlake, previously of the United States delegation, in his absence, our good wishes on his new appointment, and also to congratulate Mr. George Bunn, with whose incisive mind we are already familiar, on his elevation to the "front bench".

There is a great temptation, when talking about the desire of the people of the world for disarmament and peace, to suggest from time to time that we have reached a crucial phase or that we are losing our last chance of agreement. Of course there is no real "point of no return" in disarmament. Whatever the frustrations and the disappointments and even the disasters, we shall go on searching for a world without arms, because we have to; we can never decide that the whole thing has become hopeless and just give up. Indeed, it is possible to argue that in disarmament negotiations discussion is almost as valuable as agreements. As long as we are talking seriously and constructively about how to control the enormous power of the nuclear weapon, there is, I suppose, less chance that it will ever be used.

But I do believe that in ten or fifteen years from now it might be possible to look back on this summer session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and identify it as the parting of the ways. It would be, perhaps, an exaggeration to say that if we do not achieve success in the next three months disaster will follow; but it is no exaggeration to say that with every month and every year that passes without agreement the chances of effective disarmament are growing more and more remote. In the Far East a great nation of 700 million people, already deploying one of the largest standing armies in the world, is taking the first steps to become a nuclear Power; and none of us knows what that country will do with its power. None of us knows what its real aims are, and we are unlikely to know until China is drawn closer into the community of nations. What we do know is that in a very few years China will be able, if it wishes, to change the whole power structure of the world; and it will almost certainly in the last quarter of this century hold the balance between peace and war.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Meanwhile the two great nuclear Powers that for the moment hold that balance -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- are still engaged together with their allies in a great political and military confrontation. It is a balance that might conceivably be disrupted at any time if we do not do something soon effectively to control the power of nuclear weapons. Already there is talk of deploying defensive systems against ballistic missiles. It seems incredible to me that anyone really believes that there can be a fully effective defence against the sort of nuclear armoury now deployed by the two great military alliances of the world. But if that belief exists, and if it leads to the extensive deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, we should be in no doubt that the arms race will have entered a new and perhaps irreversible phase, and, furthermore, that a serious threat will be posed to whatever stability is provided by the present balance of nuclear power.

If China continues to develop as a nuclear weapon Power outside the community of nations, and if the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the West continues and intensifies, the pressures to join in this mad progress are bound to grow in other countries. The only specialized forum that exists for isolating and identifying such problems is this Committee in Geneva; and I believe it is not too extreme to say that, if we pass through another summer here in deadlock and if we have nothing but failure to report to the United Nations General Assembly in the autumn, the whole future of this Conference will be seriously at risk, and with it the whole future of disarmament negotiations.

It is useless simply to say that the political climate is not ripe for disarmament -- it never is. If it ever were, there probably would be no need for disarmament anyway. Of course it is true that, as long as one great grouping of Powers is locked in a desperate political and ideological struggle, and as long as a terrible conflict goes on in the Far East, we shall achieve no great and sweeping measures of disarmament. In passing, let me say that wars are not stopped by arguments about who is in the right and who is in the wrong. The war in Viet-Nam will not be ended thus. Instead of indulging in recriminations about it, we should concentrate on the real problem of bringing it to a halt. But meanwhile, even without such wide-ranging agreements, there is no reason why we should not take some small but vital and urgent steps that can be taken now, however unfriendly the political climate might be. One of them, of course, is an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

As I have said, we have now only three months left before this Committee reports back to the United Nations General Assembly. Three months is a short enough period in which to achieve any real progress, when we recall that we have had one draft treaty on non-proliferation before us since last August (ENDC/152) and another dating back to last September (ENDC/164). But the passage of time does not necessarily bring agreement any nearer, even though the consequences of not achieving agreement do become alarmingly clear; and converts are seldom made nowadays by confronting unbelievers with the prospect of perdition. What is now needed is a positive and collective act of faith which will certainly require political courage and will possibly involve what might seem to some people to be short-term risks. If we can talk of having a break-through in the field of armaments, it should be possible to think in terms of a break-through in the field of disarmament.

It is not only the intrinsic merits of this or that proposal which determine its viability but also the degree to which people are prepared to back it, perhaps at the expense of other measures or other interests. I can speak only for my own Government, which is ready to support any measure that would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. I think we can all draw encouragement from the efforts that are being made to find common ground for agreement. Even in the brief period that has elapsed since we last met in mid-May, some quite significant developments have taken place. There has been, for instance, the important conference held in Mexico City, where the preparations for the de-nuclearization of Latin America seem to have made a hopeful and realistic start.

I should like also to welcome the idea behind the initiative taken by the Soviet Union on 31 May -- following the earlier initiative of the United States -- proposing the application of international law to prevent the use of the moon for military purposes. It is encouraging that they should seek to bring a greater number of countries into the research and exploration effort, and that they should enunciate the principle that celestial bodies should be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination. Those are all promising developments, and I hope that they will at some time lead to concrete and effective measures of arms control.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

However, to return to our most urgent problem, let us look at the position we have reached in our search for a non-proliferation agreement. As the representative of the Soviet Union pointed out on 10 May, the day on which we recessed -- and I was glad to note that he was not wholly pessimistic --, "the positions of the various parties have been clarified and we have ascertained what lies at the basis of the fundamental divergencies among members ..." (ENDC/PV.263, p.29). As I see it, and as other representatives have already implied, we have really been engaged in two sets of negotiations on this subject of non-proliferation: one between the two nuclear alliances on the wording of the clauses in the treaty which deal directly with non-dissemination; the other between the nuclear weapon States on the one hand, and on the other those States which have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, supported by other non-nuclear States which share their concern for security in a world governed by a non-proliferation agreement and in which they have given up the nuclear weapon option.

I believe that the Conference had inevitably to devote most of its attention to the first of those problems. The second is in effect about what guarantees of security and what concurrent limitations and reductions in nuclear armament are to be offered by the present nuclear weapon States. But here, too, agreement must be reached between, in the first instance, the two nuclear alliances; and the chances of such agreement are small as long as they cannot agree on the non-disseminatory clauses in a treaty. Once these clauses have been agreed it will, I am convinced, not be difficult to settle the terms of any guarantees or security assurances which non-nuclear Powers might find necessary, or to agree on measures for limiting and reducing the armories of the nuclear weapon States -- those measures which would accompany or follow the signing of a treaty.

As I pointed out in an earlier speech, my delegation believes that a world in which the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries has been stopped will be a safer world for everyone even if we find it impossible at the same instant to check the increase in the armaments of the nuclear weapon States. I am strengthened in this belief by the fact that no member of this Conference has suggested that the security of his or her country would be enhanced by the acquisition of nuclear weapons tomorrow. That does not, of course, mean that the non-nuclear countries or the whole

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

world would not be still better off if, simultaneously with a non-proliferation agreement, we reached agreement to limit and reduce all nuclear armaments. These measures of nuclear disarmament are of the greatest importance. Even if we could agree upon the terms of a non-proliferation treaty at this Conference, the chances of persuading all militarily-significant States to sign it would be very much reduced if the nuclear Powers were to go on to develop still more deadly weapons -- in short if, as I suggested earlier, the arms race continued and grew more intense. In such circumstances it might even be difficult for some States which signed the treaty immediately to continue to adhere to it.

I do not expect that to be the sequence of events; indeed, I should expect the reverse to be true, namely, that the signing of a treaty would increase the momentum of disarmament and also be a containing influence on nuclear weapon development. Even so, the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear armaments would clearly then become an essential and urgent step on the way to general and complete disarmament. The history of disarmament negotiations has shown that the painful and limited progress made so far has been achieved by means of separate incomplete steps each concluded after enormous efforts. If we can go two steps forward at once, so much the better. However, if that is not possible, to take one step at a time is immeasurably better than taking none at all.

To return to the basic question of a non-proliferation treaty: it is evident that the first obstacle in the way of agreement on the non-disseminatory clauses of a treaty is a difference of view between the Western and the Eastern Powers on the arrangements for the disposition of forces, and for consultation on their use, in a military alliance. This problem is not insoluble, but for its solution it is certainly necessary to recognize that the problem exists. My delegation believes that the United States draft treaty as now modified (ENDC/152 and Add.1) does recognize the problem and provides an effective solution of it.

It is nonsense to maintain that to acknowledge this problem in drawing up a treaty means that the treaty itself is subordinated to the interests of a particular alliance. Present nuclear arrangements within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization do not involve any dispersion of the control of nuclear weapons, a control which remains exclusively with the present nuclear weapon States. As the representative of the United States pointed out on 10 May:

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

"... we now propose a non-proliferation treaty which would reinsure this result. Once such a treaty comes into force, there will be a firm international basis for ensuring that nuclear defence arrangements in NATO do not involve proliferation of nuclear weapons to any of the participants." (ENDC/PV.263, p. 15)

As they stand on paper, the relevant clauses of the Soviet draft (ENDC/164) and of the United States draft mark positions that are not so far apart that human ingenuity need despair of finding a compromise, given good will.

Much of the argument that has so far been deployed on this issue has been the sterile argument of the cold war -- of the traditional military confrontation in central Europe. If we are to find a compromise, it can only be by first freeing ourselves from the prison of our own ideological and political attitudes which in many cases no longer have any relevance to the real problems that we face. Mr. Foster wisely said two days ago that we should not be simply wrestling here with the problems of today (ENDC/PV.264, p. 11). In the last quarter of this century the great threats to the peace and prosperity of the world will lie outside Europe, in the turbulent and seething world of Africa and Asia. If we cannot lift our eyes from the River Elbe long enough to recognize the simple facts of life about nuclear proliferation, it is unlikely that we shall find common ground for dealing with the appallingly complicated issues which will confront us all in the great conflicts of race and economic survival that are now taking the place of our outdated and irrelevant cold war in Europe. I was therefore depressed that Mr. Roshchin showed again in his speech on Tuesday the same unhealthy obsession with the affairs of Germany and Europe.

Let me now turn for a moment to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is three years since the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed. What are the prospects for agreement in this field, and how can they be improved? I should of course like to be able to flourish some brand-new proposal which would, to quote the Russian proverb, keep "the wolves replete and the sheep untouched". But I do not have anything like that up my sleeve. Indeed, I doubt whether any such remedy really exists. The Soviet position and the Western position are both well known. In our view, adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban is essential. If our scientific advice is to be relied upon -- and we have repeatedly invited from the Soviet Union an exchange on the scientific and technical aspects of the problem -- our present inability to identify positively all underground tests by seismological means alone is a regrettable but vital fact which cannot simply be brushed aside.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

But what we can do is to explore the middle ground. In his speech of 10 May my United States colleague described the proposals related to the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty put forward by Sweden (ENDC/PV.256), the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259) and Mexico (ENDC/PV.246) as "serious contributions designed to advance the work of this Committee" (ENDC/PV.263, p.18). It seems reasonable to suppose that proposals such as these might help to reconcile our differences. I note that the press communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Stockholm Conference stated:

"It was recognized by all delegations that there was a very great interest throughout the world in the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and that if seismology was to contribute to this goal its resources should be mobilized as rapidly and effectively as possible."

My own Government is always willing to share its seismological knowledge with other interested countries in the hope that this may bring us closer to a solution of the problems that arise in the context of underground nuclear tests; and I need not, I think, recall here that we had already circulated in the Committee a report on this subject last September (ENDC/155). The greater the degree of scientific and technological co-ordination that can be achieved, the more accurately we should be able to establish the extent to which seismology can contribute in bridging our positions. It is all very well to say that what is at stake here is not scientific analysis but political decision; issues, unfortunately, are seldom as simple or as clear-cut as that would imply. Political decisions are the consequence of weighing up all technical and non-technical factors that are involved; and we have certainly not done so.

As I have suggested, I should not like to think that we shall for the third year running be going back to New York with empty hands. Significantly enough, the representatives of both Mexico and the Soviet Union used the expression "empty-handed" in their speeches at our first meeting (ENDC/PV.264, pp. 5, 23).

We can scarcely hope to make dramatic progress on general and complete disarmament. So long as China continues to build a nuclear armoury, and so long as the conflict in the Far East continues, it would be idle to pretend that the great Powers will begin seriously to dismantle their military establishments. But that is not to say that we should forget general and complete disarmament. After all,

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

the partial and collateral measures that we have discussed here are only steps towards general disarmament, and I very much hope that we shall devote a substantial part of our deliberations this summer to a serious study of general and complete disarmament based on the two existing draft treaties. Perhaps we cannot expect as yet even to make substantial progress on non-proliferation or a comprehensive test ban. I have previously dealt at some length, in a speech which I made on 5 May (ENDC/PV.262), with the value of certain other collateral measures, notably the freeze and the cut-off as important contributory measures.

The United States delegation has from time to time put forward proposals that involve genuine and effective measures of disarmament, notably the proposal for the dismantling of nuclear warheads and the transfer of the fissile material to peaceful use (ENDC/172). There has been no real response from the Soviet Union, which seems to regard these proposals as inconsiderable, as a too timid and gradual approach to the problem. Perhaps I might recall the experience of a distinguished French general who visited a detachment of his troops in a particularly inhospitable piece of North African desert. He suggested to the captain in charge of the detachment that he should plant some trees for shelter. "But, mon Général," said the captain, "do you not realize that it would take them a hundred years to grow?" "Indeed," replied the general, "then you have no time to lose." I think that we have no time to lose here in Geneva. It is for us to make the most of the few opportunities that we have. If we fail to do so, opportunity may not knock again at our door.

There is, I think, a danger that we may become mesmerized by the risks and the difficulties of the problems that confront us. They are surmountable, and we must surmount them, if not by dramatic initiatives, then by persistent unrelenting study and discussion. We have, unless I am much mistaken, already begun to tackle non-proliferation in that spirit. I hope that the Soviet delegation and others will match the flexibility already shown by the Western States in offering modifications to their draft treaty on non-proliferation.

I hope that the non-aligned States will find it possible to take a more active part in trying to settle the difficulties which the nuclear States have run into over articles I and II even if they feel that that is primarily the concern of the aligned members of the Conference. For our part, I can promise that my delegation will listen sympathetically to any proposals for improving the security of the non-nuclear

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

States after a treaty has been signed. I hope that we can examine just as carefully all the proposals that now lie before the Conference and take serious account of any suggestions which may help us out of our present state of what I can only call animated immobility.

In this context, and in conclusion, I should like to put once more to the co-Chairmen and to the Committee the suggestion which I have made previously: that we signal our sense of urgency to the rest of the world by increasing the apparently rather leisurely tempo of our negotiations here. I see no reason why we should not meet three times a week instead of two. If there are decisive arguments against having another formal meeting each week --- and I doubt very much that there are --- why do we not have an informal meeting each week with no verbatim report? Perhaps we might then get down to some serious and hard negotiating, such as Mr. Foster rightly called for in his speech on Tuesday, rather than merely exchanging prepared speeches which often make up in polish and elegance what they lack in effective content. I have suggested that it would be deplorable for our future prospects if we had to go back to New York with our hands empty; and I think that we should at least demonstrate that we have tried. We should take very great care not to lay ourselves open to the charge, however unfounded and unjustified it may be, that we have been engaged in a pleasant and undemanding lakeside exercise in semantics.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to join the representatives of other delegations in welcoming in our midst the new head of the Brazilian delegation, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, and to wish him success in his new and responsible work.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee is beginning the next phase of its negotiations, during which all member States should exert their utmost efforts to achieve progress in solving the problems which the Committee has been considering for a number of years. During all this time, however, the Committee has in fact achieved no concrete results. Nor have the negotiations which have taken place during the first half of this year added anything new to this unsatisfactory balance-sheet. Therefore the complaints voiced in many quarters about this unsatisfactory state of affairs are fully justified.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

While the Committee is marking time, world developments are not standing still. The dangerous arms race is continuing and its rate is being intensified. Other events are taking place which have an unfavourable effect on the work of our Committee. As time goes on, there is a real and increasing danger that the course of events will exceed certain limits beyond which it will become impossible to achieve a satisfactory and generally-acceptable solution in regard to individual disarmament measures.

Taking account of these circumstances, the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly again addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament an urgent appeal to achieve progress in solving at least some of the questions under consideration (ENDC/161). This applies above all to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The resolution which was adopted (A/RES/2028(XX)) not only stresses the urgency of reaching agreement on effective measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly and indirectly, in any form, but also takes a position on the substance of the question. It lays down the requirements to which an effective and generally-acceptable non-proliferation treaty must correspond.

In accordance with this resolution, the spring session of the Committee devoted most of its attention to this particular question. The General Assembly resolution and the draft treaties submitted by the Governments of the USSR and the United States (ENDC/164; 152 and Add.1) enabled the Committee to discuss the subject in a concrete manner and to compare the positions adopted by individual States. In these circumstances the proposal of the USSR delegation that the Committee should proceed to consider the draft treaties on non-proliferation article by article (ENDC/PV.235, p.20) was fully justified. As we all know, however, this discussion reached a deadlock in its initial stage. A comparison of the two draft treaties showed the existence of different concepts in solving the problems of non-proliferation, and revealed the absence of a common basis for drafting a treaty.

On the one hand, the Committee had before it the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation, based on the need for a consistent solution of this question and fully in accordance with the basic requirements laid down in resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. This draft leaves no loopholes for either direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. During the negotiations

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

the Soviet delegation submitted some substantive amendments to this draft in connexion with ensuring the security of non-nuclear States (ENDC/167, p.3), and also showed its willingness to consider the question of guarantees in respect of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (ENDC/PV.245, pp. 35, 36).

On the other hand, the United States submitted a draft treaty which left some serious loop-holes allowing for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially within the framework of military groupings. The discussion which took place in our Committee in the spring of this year showed that on a number of questions the United States draft was contrary to the requirements laid down in resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. These shortcomings were not eliminated even by the amendments submitted by the United States delegation in March of this year (ENDC/152/Add.1). Above all, they failed to eliminate the basic defect deriving from the general concept of the United States approach to the question of non-proliferation: that the United States draft does not preclude, but on the contrary legalizes, the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military groupings of which both nuclear and non-nuclear States are members.

A basic feature of this concept at the present time is the desire to subordinate the question of non-proliferation to the political interests and objectives of the United States and to adapt the obligations which would follow from a non-proliferation treaty to the requirements of certain States members of NATO, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany. That position of the United States and other States members of NATO represented in our Committee has made it impossible for the Committee to achieve any progress whatsoever and has led to a deadlock in the negotiations.

Whether we can succeed in getting beyond this standstill and whether it will be possible to extricate the negotiations from this deadlock depends on the position of the Western delegations and on whether they will show readiness to solve the question of non-proliferation with due regard to the interests and justified demands of all the States concerned.

For this reason the Czechoslovak delegation carefully listened to and studied the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at the 264th meeting, mainly with a view to ascertaining whether it revealed a more realistic approach and willingness to consider a consistent and generally-acceptable solution.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

of the problem of non-proliferation which would be in conformity with resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. We are compelled to state frankly, however, that those expectations were not fulfilled. The statement of the representative of the United States gives no evidence of a more realistic attitude on the part of the United States of America or of its willingness to seek a solution of the question of non-proliferation on a generally-acceptable basis. On the contrary, this statement gives rise to further questions and doubts concerning the future conduct of the United States.

At the beginning of the year, in accordance with the opinion expressed by a vast majority of States Members of the United Nations in resolution 2028(XX), the United States delegation declared that the United States regarded the question of non-proliferation as a basic problem, to the solution of which the Committee should give the maximum attention. The statement of the representative of the United States at our last meeting, however, raised the question of whether the United States continues to hold that opinion and whether the present situation in NATO has not influenced its position in regard to the urgency of solving the problem of non-proliferation and the necessity of rapidly reaching agreement on this subject.

In his statement on 14 June Mr. Foster declared that the approach to the problem of non-proliferation should not be determined by the limited aspects of the existing situation, by the interests of the moment (ENDC/PV.264, p. 11). We can, of course, fully agree with this view. It seems to us, however, that the representative of the United States addressed this appeal to the wrong quarter by formulating it in connexion with the perfectly justifiable demand of the socialist and other States that the non-proliferation treaty should leave no loop-holes and should not provide any opportunity for dissemination in any form whatsoever, whether to individual States or within the framework of military groupings. I should like to stress that this demand, which is fully supported by the Czechoslovak delegation, is in no way determined by any particular, limited interests or the aspects of the moment, but follows quite naturally from the very essence of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

On the other hand, the entire approach of the United States to non-proliferation is wholly subordinated to its present, particular interests and objectives and to the present situation in NATO. This is fully confirmed by its original draft treaty, by the amendments thereto submitted in March this year, and by the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at our last meeting.

The Czechoslovak delegation has already pointed out in earlier statements that among the main obstacles to the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation are the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is trying to obtain access to nuclear weapons in one form or another within the framework of NATO, and the fact that the allies of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, especially the United States, are yielding to this pressure by the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States draft, both in its original and in its amended form, fully confirms this fact.

The Czechoslovak delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist countries, has shown by many facts the aims pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to nuclear armament. This question has arisen again in connexion with the note of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany communicated in March this year to the governments of a number of States. The soundness of the position taken on this question by the Czechoslovak SSR and other socialist States had once again been confirmed. The Government of the Czechoslovak SSR stated the following, inter alia, in its reply to the West German note:

"The note of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reduces the whole problem of the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons merely to the question of their actual production and their transfer to national ownership. At the same time it deliberately ignores the danger of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by indirect means, in particular by means of plans for nuclear integration within NATO, with the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. These plans -- as is well known -- are the main obstacle to the achievement of an agreement which would effectively prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form."

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

In his statement on 14 June Mr. Foster again tried to defend the position of the Federal Republic of Germany (ENDC/PV.264, pp.23-24). But the real point is not in declarations and verbal assurances. It is facts that really matter. If the Federal Republic of Germany is genuinely not trying to obtain access to nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO, and if the United States does not intend to enable it to obtain such access, what is there to prevent the United States from agreeing to a non-proliferation treaty which would consistently preclude all possibilities and bar all ways of proliferating nuclear weapons? If the United States and its Allies in NATO were to adopt such a position, it would mean that the deadlock in regard to the question of non-proliferation would be broken and the prerequisites created for a rapid and satisfactory solution of this problem.

The second problem which is among the most important of the Committee's tasks is the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. The necessity of reaching agreement on this question was mentioned in the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rov.1). The prohibition of underground tests would not only help considerably towards improving the atmosphere in relations between States, but would play an important role in efforts towards slowing down the nuclear arms race and bringing it to an end. It is being constantly confirmed in practice that underground tests facilitate the further improvement of nuclear weapons. This is also shown by the extensive programme of underground tests that is being carried out by the United States.

Delay in achieving an agreement on the complete prohibition of underground nuclear tests has no objective justification. This problem has long been ripe for solution on the same basis as the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments under the Moscow Treaty. The only obstacle to the solution of this problem is the stubborn demand of the United States for on-site inspection. The intensity with which the United States is developing its programme of underground nuclear tests bears witness to its interest in further tests. This confirms that the question of so-called on-site inspection merely serves the United States as a pretext for concealing its unwillingness to accept the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests. It is for this reason, apparently, that the initiative of the delegations of certain non-aligned States, which have been trying to help to bring about a compromise solution of this problem, has met with no favourable response on the part of the United States.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation agrees with the recommendation of the co-Chairman (ENDC/PV.264, p.25) that at this stage of the negotiations in the Committee due attention should also be given to the discussion of further collateral measures and of general and complete disarmament. The priority which is at present assigned to the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of underground nuclear explosions in no way minimizes the importance of other questions, and in particular does not deprive the question of general and complete disarmament of its key place among the tasks of the Committee. In the course of future negotiations the Czechoslovak delegation will have occasion to explain in detail its position on these questions.

The general situation in the world, the aggravation or alleviation of international tension, has a considerable effect on the conditions of the solution of all international problems. For all the more reason this applies to the questions on the agenda of our Committee. In January this year, and then again at the conclusion of the spring session of the Committee, the Czechoslovak delegation pointed out that the intensely aggressive course taken by the policy of the United States in South West Asia, Latin America, Africa and other parts of the world is having an extremely adverse effect on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. From this point of view, United States aggression in Viet-Nam has the most serious consequences.

This is due, above all, to the fact that the intensification of aggression against the Viet-Nameese people, the increase in the number of United States armed forces in Viet-Nam, which now already amount to nearly 300,000 men, and the extension of aggressive activities to the territories of other States in this region are creating a dangerous hotbed of tension and constitute a serious threat to world peace. The gravity, danger and harm of these activities from the point of view of world peace and directly from the point of view of disarmament are beyond dispute and perfectly obvious. For this reason we cannot bypass them in our negotiations, since our task is to reach agreement on measures the implementation of which would help towards consolidating international peace and reducing the danger of the outbreak of war.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

This aggressive policy, however, has yet another aspect which directly concerns our negotiations. It is indissolubly linked with the intensification of the arms race. This is shown by developments in the United States, whose expenditure on armaments has increased by \$15,000 million as against last year. This again is linked to the continuing negotiations on plans for nuclear armament integration in NATO, the implementation of which would undoubtedly have extremely serious consequences in Europe and would give rise to a further aggravation of tension and to the intensification of the arms race in this part of the world.

After all, it is impossible to do two mutually-exclusive things at the same time: to intensify the arms race and to disarm. This irreconcilable contradiction in the United States position, which derives from its policy, is one of the main reasons for the failure of our negotiations to produce results. There is no point whatever in shutting our eyes to the fact that even now this harmful line of the foreign policy of the United States, which had a direct effect on our negotiations, has not changed but that, on the contrary, the situation continues to deteriorate. These facts cannot be written off simply by labelling as propaganda all statements which rightly criticize and condemn the aggressive policy of the United States.

If the United States were to put an end to its aggression in Viet-Nam and abandon its plans for the nuclear integration of NATO, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany were to put an end to its policy, which is a source of tension in Europe, there would be no need to discuss these questions during our negotiations. There can be no doubt that the cessation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam and the taking of measures to ensure security in Europe would substantially facilitate the work of our Committee, both in regard to individual collateral measures, particularly the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in regard to general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to associate myself with the welcome which other delegations have extended to the new representative of Brazil, Mr. Azareda da Silveira, and to wish him in my turn constructive and efficient work, as I am sure that the co-operation between his delegation and mine will be, as always, most satisfactory and cordial. I should also like to greet my friend George Bunn, to congratulate him on the new responsibility

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

which his Government has assigned to him in recognition of his qualities and merits, and to ask him to express my sincere feelings of friendship and my best wishes to his predecessor Mr. Timberlake.

My delegation considers that it was wise and useful to begin this session, as usual, with a general exchange of views which, in our opinion, should deal with concrete elements for the purpose of promoting the speedy and positive conclusion of the work we began last January.

The interruption of our work has been brief, and consequently there is no need to make any new assessments of a political situation which in fact has not changed during this lapse of time. The repetition of tendentious and erroneous assessments of this situation which, unfortunately, we heard last Tuesday and today from the representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia can have a very negative effect on the progress of our work. We are well aware that the general situation -- a dangerous situation for which the West does not bear the responsibility -- can affect the progress of our work here to some extent. At the same time, however, we are convinced, as the representative of Mexico also rightly pointed out last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.264, pp. 6 et seq.), that this Committee can and must, in its turn, through results such as we all wish for, exercise a favourable influence on this situation and facilitate a relaxation of tension and rapprochement.

Thus the Committee, in the relatively short time available to it, should attain a dual objective: it should operate in such a way that the general political situation would be improved thereby; and it should give a positive response to the urgent appeal addressed to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations. These two objectives are so closely linked that in fact they form a single objective, that of improving the world situation and responding to the desire for peace.

To attain this goal at the practical level we must now draw conclusions from the premises laid down during our last session by work which, as several delegations have recognized, was useful, extensive and thorough. To this end, it is essential for us not only to draw up a time schedule for this session, as we have already done in part, but also to outline a specific plan of work, and that is what we should try to do during this general debate. We must therefore choose, with a sense of realism, from the ample subject-matter to be considered, the subjects which, thanks to the previous debates and to our past experience, seem to be ripest for solution, and concentrate our efforts on these in accordance with a pre-established order of priority.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

My delegation is, of course, entirely in favour of the idea that general and complete disarmament should not be neglected during this session, as it is essential for us always to keep in mind the essential but unfortunately distant objective of this Conference. It would be perhaps too optimistic, however, to believe that our Committee can in a few meetings make any great progress in this vast and still controversial matter.

On the other hand, a certain number of the collateral measures proposed to the Conference also involve obstacles which we know to be serious and, in the present circumstances, difficult to overcome. Indeed, where some of these proposals are concerned it seems difficult to be able rapidly to establish an identity of views among us about how they correspond to the principle of balance. Moreover, we are aware of the major obstacles which the Soviet Union always raises in connexion with control. It is these objections which unfortunately prevent us from attacking the nuclear arms race at its roots, by beginning the disarmament process with measures for a verified cut off or freeze. I have too much respect for the realism of the Soviet delegation to believe that it really attaches no importance to those measures, as it has sometimes stated. I think that the Soviet delegation, being aware that a cut-off or freeze is inconceivable without control, rejects these proposals because it is not prepared to accept inspection on Soviet territory.

These considerations -- namely, the need to apply the principle of balance and control to collateral measures -- lead me once again to look upon the two questions of the banning of underground tests and non-dissemination as those which present the least difficulty in reaching rapid agreement and which now call for the closest attention from us.

Of course, everyone knows that, where the banning of tests is concerned, the Western delegations consider that a certain number of inspections are still necessary; but this requirement is based on technical data which are in the process of evolution. I believe that it is more necessary and urgent today than ever before to make a joint study of the details of the technical and scientific situation on which, as Lord Chalfont rightly pointed out this morning, political decisions are based. This study could and should take into account also the various proposals which have been submitted by the non-aligned delegations and which would make it possible to obtain, if not complete solutions of the problem, at least extremely useful and important ones.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

It would also be interesting to know the conclusions -- provisional, I suppose, but certainly not negligible -- at which the recent technical meeting at Stockholm arrived. The representatives of the countries which participated in that meeting, particularly the representatives of Sweden, could explain and illustrate to this Committee the results of the first meeting of the "detection club", and our Committee could then express its views on the subject.

I now turn to the problem of non-proliferation. The position of my delegation not only on the substance of the question but also on the procedure is already known. We think it would be useful, indeed, necessary, to begin the work of drafting a text on a comparative basis. I am fully aware that it is not by drafting a text on which agreement is only partial that profound differences of opinion can be eliminated. Nevertheless, a text in part jointly drafted and agreed and in part still to be agreed would enable us to see more clearly and to specify more precisely the points of agreement and the points of disagreement, the latter thus becoming circumscribed and delimited. It is also possible that as a result of this drafting work the divergencies may appear less striking, the polemical statements made during the debates having possibly caused confusion in the matter. If such a text were available to the Committee, the words on paper would leave no doubt or ambiguity, and we should then have a concrete and common basis for discussion. The submission of such a text to the General Assembly of the United Nations would enable us to demonstrate clearly the efforts that have been made here as well as what remains to be done; it would also facilitate the discussions in the Assembly. Its preparation is not an impossible task.

The two draft treaties, that of the United States (ENDC/152 and Add.1) and that of the Soviet Union (ENDC/164), already show a parallelism, especially after the introduction of the United States amendments. Article I of the United States text corresponds in substance to article I of the Soviet text. The same applies to article II. The United States article III does not appear to correspond to the Soviet article III. But the latter, which is still rather obscure, requires explanations; as my delegation has already indicated in another statement. The two articles IV are different. But all the other articles of the two drafts have an obvious parallelism and sometimes a close resemblance.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

This comparative study would correspond, moreover, to the article-by-article examination which the Soviet delegation has promised us (ENDC/PV.235, p. 20) and which the representative of Czechoslovakia has recalled and confirmed this morning.

It would therefore be useful to prepare, first of all and without delay, a Conference working document showing the articles of one of the drafts in one column and the corresponding articles of the other draft in the other column. This comparative or, so to speak, visual study has certainly already been made by delegations, but it would assume a different aspect if it appeared in an official document of the Conference. On the basis of such a document we could begin, patiently but rapidly, our work of bringing the texts closer together through a comparative study of each word and each sentence, ascertaining exactly to what extent the differences lie in the words or in the substance and whether they can be overcome through amendment. It is obvious that in this work we must also take into account all the amendments that may be submitted by one or another delegation.

The Soviet delegation could show its good will by proposing in its turn, after the amendments submitted by the United States delegation, some changes to its text. This text, I recall, was submitted last September, and the Soviet delegation should, as the United States delegation has already done, take into account the comments made since that date by all the delegations in this Committee.

Furthermore, my delegation has not forgotten that the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to this Committee (A/RES/2028(XX); ENDC/161), as the basis of its work, not only the two draft texts submitted by the United States and Soviet delegations but also the memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations (ENDC/158) and the Italian draft declaration of unilateral renunciation (ENDC/157).

Hence the way remains open for the submission of amendments arising out of the memorandum to which I have just referred, thus enabling the non-aligned delegations further to explain their positions during the work of amalgamating the two texts.

The declaration of unilateral renunciation proposed by Italy with a view to a controlled nuclear moratorium naturally does not come into question, because it concerns only a situation in which the efforts to achieve the conclusion of a treaty would be shown to be ineffectual. Our position in that regard has not changed.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

We still consider that the conclusion of an equitable treaty would be the complete and integral solution of the problem of non-proliferation. Nevertheless, we also think that the adoption of a voluntary, controlled moratorium could be a useful, temporary and intermediate solution.

The Italian delegation reserves the right to submit its proposal again if the Conference looks like coming to the end of its current session without having obtained any concrete results. It is then that it would do its best to take into account the opinions that have been expressed by several delegations and any observations that have been made, either in specific regard to our initiative or in general regard to the problem of non-proliferation.

Such is the plan of work which my delegation suggests to the Committee and which it proposes to follow itself. We must set about working with renewed vigour and be prepared to make the greatest effort of understanding and goodwill, for we are all aware of the importance of this session and of the need to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a report which would at last be positive and constructive.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 265th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. G.O. Ijewere, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 21 June 1966, at 10.30.a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.